Abstract. This paper considers an optimal control perspective on dynamic power price problem where the load on the power-grid is controlled via price. The optimal regulatory price is characterized by inverse variational inequality in which the function value and the control variable are in the opposite positions of the classical variational inequality. Discrete and continuum models with load constraints are developed and existence theorems are established under quite reasonable assumptions. Preliminary numerical results also show the feasibility of the proposed models.
Introduction.
Let Ω be a nonempty subset of R n and let f be a mapping from R n into itself. The classical variational inequality (VI) problem, denoted by VI(Ω,f ), is to find
In the past decades, the theory of VI has established itself as a powerful methodology in dealing with many equilibrium control problems. VI relates to many interesting mathematical problems such as system of nonlinear equations, optimization problems, complementary problems and fixed point problems. Therefore, VI has many applications and has been studied by many researchers. Interested readers may consult the monograph [5] , the excellent survey paper [6] and the references therein. However, as pointed out in [7] , there exist quiet a few control problems in which the equilibrium state f (x * ) rather than the optimal control variable x * is required to be in Ω, which in such case contains all feasible states y. Such problems can be reduced to find x * ∈ R n such that
Denoted by IVI(Ω, f ), problem (2) is called inverse VI (IVI) in [7] because the system states and control variables are in the opposite positions of the classical VI characterization (1) . Similarly, there are also problems in transportation control and commodity circulation that can be boiled down to find x * ∈ R n such that the equilibrium state f (x * ) satisfies
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We denote (3) by IVI − (Ω, f ). In essence, both (2) and (3) are special cases of the general VI (GVI), which is to find x * ∈ R n such that f (x * ) ∈ Ω, (y − f (x * )) T g(x * ) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Ω.
Problems (2) and (3) correspond to g(x) = x and g(x) = −x in GVI, respectively. It is not difficult to show that IVI − (Ω, f ) = IVI(−Ω, −f ) and thus we call (2) and (3) uniformly IVI. Just like the classical VI problems, IVI problems also arise from a broad spectrum of application fields. Considering their specialties, we may expect to develop simple techniques to solve them directly rather than treat them as GVI. For example, He et al. [8, 9] proposed some proximal point based algorithms to solve (3) directly.
In this paper, we consider an optimal control perspective on dynamic power price problem where the load on the power-grid is controlled via price and establish discrete and continuum IVI models with load constraints for this problem. It is well known that dynamic power price strategy is an important technique used by the electric power managing department both to balance the supply-demand market and to enhance the safety and stability of the power system. In order to shift the peak load and to fulfill the valley load, the managing department usually adjusts the power price according to the current status of power load. In order to enhance the reliability of the electric power system, there has been significant research conducted on this topic. Models have been proposed for simulating the interaction of competing generation companies by Kahn [14] and for investigating different degrees of decentralization in electricity markets in [1, 11, 18, 19] . However, for most of the work on equilibrium control problems, the equilibrium states are characterized by VI problem (1), see [2, 4, 12, 16] , rather than IVI problem (2) or (3).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the dynamic power price problem and introduce our motivation to characterize it by IVI. In section 3, we divide a period of time into n peak-valley intervals and model the dynamic power price problem into a discrete n dimensional IVI. Continuum IVI model is developed in section 4. Existence theorems are established for each model under quite reasonable assumptions. Preliminary numerical results are presented in section 5 to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed models and finally some conclusion remarks are given in section 6.
2. The problem and motivation. Suppose G is a large power generator managed by the government and there are m different power suppliers s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m who buy electric power from the generator G and sell them to the demand markets. The electric power generated by the generator G should first be transmitted to different suppliers s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m and then be transmitted to the demand markets. Suppliers decide the selling price themselves based on different conditions, such as the supplydemand status, the economic conditions of their users and the strategies of their competitors etc. Therefore, the unit power price decided by different suppliers maybe different and thus different suppliers are competitors of one another.
How to decide the optimum selling price is a problem that each supplier has to solve. Let us take supplier s for example. If the price defined by s is too high, then obviously he is uncompetitive and thus loss many users. Conversely, if the price is too low, the load on the power-grid will increase dramatically which may damage the power system. Suppose we divide a period of time T = [t,t] into n intervals according to the peak-valley of the load and in each interval the price is a constant. Let x ∈ R n + be the price and q(x) ∈ R n + be the load on the grid which is a function DYNAMIC POWER PRICE PROBLEM: AN IVI APPROACH 675 of the price x. We assume that q(x) is continuous and nonincreasing with respect to (w.r.t.) x, which is quiet reasonable. Generally, based on experience, each supplier s has a feasible price interval [a, b] = {ξ ∈ R n |a ξ b} where a, b ∈ R n ++ are constant vectors. In order to balance the supply-demand market, to enhance the safety and stability of the power system and to protect the power-grid, supplier s hopes to keep the load q(·) on the grid to be a constant vector r ∈ R n which is optimum in some sense. If the load q(·) cannot be equal to r when x ranges in the feasible price interval [a, b] , one would like to keep the two as close as possible. Now, we show that the optimum price x * defined by s solves VI([a, b], r − q(x)), i.e.,
Suppose ζ ∈ R n is a vector. For i = 1, . . . , n, let us denote
where ζ i is the ith component of ζ. Considering the continuity and nonincreasing property of q(x), the following is the well known "user's optimization" approach
is the ith component of q(·). Therefore, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
By adding the above from 1 to n, we see that x * solves (4). From the above discussion, we know that, in order to win competition and to protect power-grid, the decision of each supplier s should be a solution of VI in the form of (4). The m different suppliers solve m different VIs.
However, the problem faced by the government is different from that by the suppliers. From the government point of view, dynamic power price strategy should also be used to control the load on power-grid, to guarantee energy supply and to use electric resource rationally etc. Usually, the government hopes that the load q(x) on the power-grid ranges in a fixed interval rather than keeps a specific value. The problems faced by the government and the suppliers are of two levels, i.e., the upper level problem which controls the optimum state and the lower level problem which makes an optimal decision. Similar two level problems also arise from commodity circulation, transport control problems and management science, see [7] . We will show in the following two sections that the strategy of the government solves IVI rather than VI.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the load on the power-grid is continuous and nonincreasing w.r.t. the price.
3. A discrete model. We still use the notation introduced in the former section. A period of time T = [t,t] is divided into n intervals according to the peak-valley of the load and within each interval the price keeps constant. The load, which is a function of the price, is denoted by q(·). Suppose x 0 ∈ R n + is the current price and y 0 = q(x 0 ) ∈ R n + is the corresponding load status. Due to some unavoidable yet regular causes such as construction or services of electricity generators, changing of seasons, different time period in a day etc., the peak-valley and the constraints of the load vary, and thus the current load state y 0 violates the new constraints. In this case, we must adjust the price from x 0 to x 0 + x in order to control the load.
Let a ≺ b be two positive vectors in R n which represent the new lower and upper load constraints, respectively. Let Ω = {ξ ∈ R n |a ξ b} be the set of all feasible load states and f (x) = q(x 0 + x) be the function of the regulatory price x. From our assumption, f (x) is continuous and nonincreasing w.r.t. x.
Obviously one does not need to adjust the price (x * = 0) if the current state y 0 belongs to Ω. Now, the problem is what if y 0 /
∈ Ω? Our aim is to find an optimal regulatory price x * such that the corresponding state f (x * ) should not violate the load constraints, namely f (x * ) ∈ Ω. Considering that the current price x 0 , which maybe obtained based on perennial experience, is optimal in some sense, that the variation of the load constraints is usually not very large, and also for the sake of stability, it is advantageous to regulate the price as small as possible. Furthermore, in view of the fact that f (x) is continuous and nonincreasing w.r.t. x, we define the optimal regulatory price as follows:
Definition 3.1. The regulatory price x * ∈ R n is optimal if f (x * ) ∈ Ω and, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the following conditions hold
This definition is known as the "user's optimization" strategy (see e.g. [12, 13] ) which means both to satisfy the constraints and to regulate the price as small as possible. 
Proof. Denote the ith component of
Conversely, suppose x * ∈ R n satisfies (5). Let {1, 2, . . . , n} = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ I 3 , where
For any i 0 ∈ I 1 , set
± ǫ where ǫ is sufficiently small, then y ∈ Ω and from (5) we get x * i0 = 0. For any i 0 ∈ I 3 , set y i = f i (x * ) if i = i 0 and y i0 = a i0 , then y ∈ Ω and from (5) we get x * i0 ≥ 0. In the following, we will show that (5) admits a solution under very reasonable assumptions. Suppose y 0i is the ith component of y 0 . First, we define the projection of y 0 onto the feasible load set Ω as follows
Considering that f (x) is nonincreasing w.r.t. x, which is a result of the market law, if we take x i < 0 for those i with y 0i ≥ b i , certainly f i (x) ≥ b i will not be changed; if we increase x i from 0 to a value large enough, then f i (x) ≤ b i will happen. As such, we assume reasonably that there exists
From the above discussion, we assume that there exists a constant Proof. Define W = R n × Ω and denote
Firstly, we show that (5) is equivalent to VI(W, F ), i.e.,
In fact, if u * = (x * , y * ) T ∈ W solves (7), then the following holds (6) we know that
is bounded. Since f (x) is continuous and so is F (u), (7) admits a solution (see [5] , page 146) and so is (5).
4.
A continuum model. Practically, the load on the grid depends not only on the price but also on the time t ∈ T and the load constraints depend on time too. So, it is more reasonable to extend the discrete model to a time dependent one. We focus our attention on a period of time T = [t,t]. Let x 0 (t) : T → R ++ be the current price function which varies continuously w.r.t. t ∈ T and q(t, x 0 (t)) be the current load curve which depends not only on x 0 (t) but also on t ∈ T . Let a(t), b(t) : T → R + , a(t) < b(t) be the lower and upper load constraints, respectively. Suppose T is a cycle and thus a(t) = a(t), b(t) = b(t). Denote by L 2 (T, R) the set of all square integrable functions defined on T , namely
We assume that a(t) and b(t) are in L 2 (T, R). The set of all feasible load curves is denoted by Ω, namely
and is endowed with norm:
It is easily shown that Ω is convex, closed and bounded in L 2 (T, R). Suppose x(t) : T → R is the regulatory price and let f (t, x(t)) = q(t, x 0 (t) + x(t)). Our aim is to find an optimal regulatory price x * (t) such that the load curve f (t, x * (t)) lies in Ω, i.e., the load constraints should not be violated. We make the following assumptions:
, a.e. in T . Similar to definition 3.1, we give the following definition:
∈ Ω and the following conditions hold a.e. in T :
is optimal according to definition 4.1 if and only if x * (t) solves
Proof. Suppose x * (t) is an optimal regulatory strategy according to definition 4.1, then f (t, x * (t)) ∈ Ω and it is easy to see that [y(t) − f (t, x * (t))]x * (t) ≤ 0 a.e. in T , ∀ y(t) ∈ Ω. Hence (10) holds.
Conversely, let us prove that if x * (t) ∈ L 2 (T, R) such that f (t, x * (t)) ∈ Ω and (10) holds then x * (t) fulfills definition 4.1. Let us consider the function
It is easy to see that ψ(y) ≥ 0 and ψ(f (t, x * (t))) = 0. The convex set Ω satisfies the constraint qualification condition that its quasi-relative interior is nonempty, which replaces the standard Slater's condition for the infinite dimensional case. Then, following [3] it is not difficult to show the following results. 
is equivalent to the problem
where
Let us consider the dual problem:
and the problem: max δ∈∆ δ
The following results hold.
Lemma 4.4 ([3], Lemma 2.3). (λ,Λ) ∈ C
* is a maximal solution to the dual problem (12) if and only if
is a solution to (13). (11) is solvable, then the dual problem (12) is also solvable and the extremal values of the two problems are equal.
Lemma 4.5 ([3], Lemma 2.4). If the primal problem

Now let us consider the Lagrangian function
The following result holds.
Lemma 4.6 ([3], Theorem 3.1).
if and only if y solves the primal problem (11), (λ,Λ) solves the dual problem (12) and the extremal values of the two problems are equal.
From lemmas 4.5, 4.6 and the fact that f (t, x * (t)) solves the primal problem (11), it follows that
Taking into account (14) and the fact that
From definition 4.1 and C * , it is easy to see that x * (t),λ(t),Λ(t) and f (t, x * (t)) are all in L 2 (T, R). Since we are only interested in the sense of measure, by choosing in turn y(t) = f (t, x * (t)) ± −x * (t) −λ(t) +Λ(t) , we obtain x * (t) +λ(t) −Λ(t) = 0, a.e. in T.
Note thatλ(t),λ(t) ≥ 0 a.e. in T , from (15) and in virtue of (14), we know that x * (t) fulfills definition 4.1.
Similar to the discrete case, we make a little stronger yet still reasonable assumption that there exists a constant M ′ > 0 such that for any
where y proj 0 (t) is the projection of y 0 (t) = f (t, 0) onto the feasible load set Ω defined in (9), namely
Assumption (16) simply means that if we adjust the price large enough(x 0 (t) positive enough for y 0 (t) ≥ b(t) and negative enough for y 0 (t) ≤ a(t)), then the resulted load curve f (t, x(t)) will be strictly controlled in the interior of the feasible set Ω. We will prove existence result under the above assumption and by taking into account the following classical existence theorem.
Theorem 4.7. Let E be a real topological vector space and let W ⊆ E be convex, closed, bounded and nonempty. Let C : Ω → E * be given such that C is monotone and hemicontinuous along line segments. Then, there exists u * ∈ W such that
Theorem 4.8. Assume that conditions (i), (ii) and (16) hold, then IVI problem (10) admits a solution.
Proof. Define W = L 2 (T, R) × Ω and denote
we will show that (10) is equivalent to the following VI
If (17) holds true, then we can get easily that
holds for all u(t) = (x(t), y(t)) T ∈ W. Set x(t) = x * (t) − y * (t) + f (t, x * (t)) and y(t) = y * (t) in (18), we can see that f (t, x * (t)) = y * (t) a.e. in T . Thus f (t, x * (t)) ∈ Ω and (18) indicates that (10) holds. Conversely, if x * (t) ∈ L 2 (T, R) is a solution of (10), then u * (t) = (x * (t), f (t, x * (t))) T ∈ W is a solution of (17) .
From assumptions (ii) and (16), we know that any
′ is too large to be a solution of (10) and thus we only need to concentrate on the bounded set
a.e. in T, ∀ u = (x, y)
From (19) , it follows that
for all u, v ∈ W ′ and hence the operator C is monotone. From assumption (i) and Lebesgue control and convergence theorem, it is easily shown that
holds for each sequence λ n → λ, λ n , λ ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ u, v ∈ W ′ (see also [12] ). Thus we have
namely the operator C(u) is hemicontinuous along line segments. Furthermore, W ′ is a convex, closed and bounded set which is immediately derived from the convexity, closeness, boundedness of Ω and the definition of L 2 M ′ . Therefore, from theorem 4.7, (17) admits a solution and so is (10) . This end the proof of the theorem.
Preliminary numerical results.
In this section, we present some tentative numerical results to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed IVI models. In the experiment, we take a quite simple case in which the original price is a constant, i.e., x 0 (t) ≡ c and thus the original load curve is determined by f (t, 0) = q(t, c) for t ∈ [0, 24). We all know that with the rapid development of national economy people's living standards are improved continuously. The electric power system architecture has met some new changes with the growing household appliances, especially in urban areas. For example, during the past summer, the highest peak load on the power-grid of Nanjing was up to 5.4 × 10 6 KW while on the same day the valley load was less than 2.0 × 10 6 KW. This load curve is plotted by dashed line on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 . The situation in Shanghai is even worse. This huge peak-valley difference on the power-grid usually brings potential problems. To enhance the safety and stability of the power system, the management department hopes to control the load within some bound constraints.
According to different power load categories, such as the consumption of urban and rural residents, industrial production, transportation and commercial catering etc., some of them cannot be easily cut down by minor increasing of power price while others may have large freedom to be adjusted. Generally speaking, the decreasing speed of power load by increasing power price is much slower than that of the increasing speed by decreasing power price. Based on this consideration, we constructed a function to simulate the true relation between power price and load as follows
where log is the natural logarithm. From (20), with the increasing of power price, the load declines at a speed of logarithm, and contrary it climbs at a much faster speed. Obviously this is a simplification of the real case because the load status depends on not only the current power price but also the whole price strategy. We used (20) only to illustrate the feasibility of our IVI models. Furthermore, the fixed iteration (21) only depends on function values and can be implemented even without the analytic expression of f (t, x). We refer readers who are interested in reliable modeling of electricity consumption and short-run movements in the load curves to the traditional approaches of spline and Fourier models [10, 15] and a more recent constrained smoothing splines estimator [17] . The time space [0, 24) was uniformly divided into 240 intervals, and without loss of generality c was set to be 1. The sample points form a set T with 240 elements. We denote {x(t)|t ∈ T } by X ∈ R 240 . The lower and upper bounds were set to be two constant vectors, specifically a = 2.57 × 10 6 × 1 and b = 4.63 × 10 6 × 1 where 1 ∈ R 240 with elements all ones, and are plotted by dash-dot lines on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 . The resulted discrete form of problem (10) is solved by a fixed point based iteration algorithm
where β k > 0 is a sequence of positive numbers, Ω = {v ∈ R 240 |a v b} is the feasible load region and P Ω [·] is the projection operator onto Ω. We simply set β k ≡ 1 though it can be decided adaptively to speed up convergence. It is easily shown (see [7] ) that X k solves the discretized form of (10) if and only if X k+1 = X k . Before we started the test, the average load was scaled to be 1 to balance the magnitude of f (T, X) and X. The iteration is stopped if
After 16 iterations, we got an accuracy of stopc = 4.52 × 10 −7 . The new load curve is plotted by solid line on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 ; the original and the computed new price strategy are shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 1 . It can be seen from Fig. 1 that the peak area is shifted, the valley area is fulfilled and thus the new load curve satisfies the bound constraints. Furthermore, as indicated by our definition of optimal regulatory price in definitions 3.1 and 4.1, the price is increased (decreased) if the new load attains the upper (lower) bound and remains unchanged if the new load falls within the bound constraints. After this adjustment, the highest price is raised up to nearly 125% while the lowest is dragged down to only about 62% of the original, which happens during the peak and valley areas of the original load respectively. The reason why the load and price remain unchanged in areas that do not violate the bound constraints is because the naive simplification of f (t, x) given in (20), from which we know that the new load at time t depends on the initial load and the adjustment of price at the current time, which limited our experiments. Practical situation should be that the load depends on the whole price strategy x 0 + x rather than the pointwise value and thus will be changed a little even it does not violate load constraints. The problem of how to forecast the load as a function of time and price is obviously important but beyond the concern of this paper.
6. Conclusions and remarks. In this paper, we developed discrete and continuum models for dynamic power price problem with load constraints. The problem was characterized by IVIs and existence theorems were established under quite reasonable assumptions. It is well known that VI models have been discussed extensively for problems such as transportation networks, time-dependent traffic equilibrium and dynamical power systems, etc. However, in many equilibrium state control problems arising from transportation control, commodity circulation, economic equilibrium and management science, the equilibrium states, instead of the control variables, are required to be in a constrained set. They usually appear as two level problems, the upper level problem is faced by the control and management section while the lower level problem is solved by the operator. These topics have not yet been studied in the IVI setting. It is our belief that the research on IVI is of importance both in theory and in practical computation. Some PPA based direct methods for IVI have already been proposed in [8, 9] which only use function values and this is also our recent research interests. We hope this paper may stimulate further investigation in this direction.
